This article analyzes the impact of the large-scale energy crisis triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the escalation of geopolitical tensions around Iran on the global oil and gas industry and the global economy. It argues that the current shock differs from the crises of the 1970s and 1980s in that it features a more significant, immediate drop in oil volumes from the market and a different nature of the shortage, shifting the focus from a physical shortage of fuel to price and financial effects. It demonstrates the key role of strategic energy reserves and oil stored on tankers in mitigating the short-term shortage, as well as their long-term contribution to prolonging the crisis through the need for subsequent reserve replenishment. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the crisis on Russia’s export positions, the dynamics of the discount/premium to Brent crude, budget revenues and the tax base, as well as the transformation of Russia’s orientation toward the markets of China, India, and other countries of the Global South. The article analyzes new EU sanctions mechanisms (including discussions of the 20th sanctions package), attacks on export infrastructure, restrictions on the «shadow fleet,» and the prospects for Russian LNG as flows shift to Asian markets. It examines changes in the behavior of key Gulf exporters, including the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and the associated risks of disrupting the OPEC/ OPEC+ coordination formats, as well as the possible redistribution of regulatory roles between regional and external players. Scenarios for the fragmentation of global trade, the growing importance of overland routes and integration blocs (BRICS+, CIS, etc.), and the formation of a more regionalized architecture of energy and trade ties are discussed. It concludes that the global energy sector is entering a phase of structural turbulence and a gradual transition from the globalization model to a combination of regional and bloc cooperation formats.