Nord Stream 2: Conceptual Research Approaches, Risks and National Interests of The Participating Countries

The article examines the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project from an economic perspective as well as from the standpoint of compliance with the interests of the main actors: Russia, Germany and the USA. The authors consider the chronology of the gas pipeline approval and construction. The article gives a detailed description of the obstacles to the implementation of the project that exist at the pan-European level (the third energy package of the European Union) and directly in Germany (the Green Party), on the level of individual EU countries (Denmark, Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic States), and the United States (the CAATSA law, the bill “On European Energy Security”). The authors analyze the opinions of Russian, German and American expert communities and the media regarding the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline before and after the German-American agreement was reached in July 2021. In addition, the gas pipeline project was considered from the point of view of the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation, Germany and the United States. The main purpose of this article is to characterize the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project in the context of meeting the expectations of actors associated with it. The paper assesses the position of the Russian Federation in the issue under consideration and puts forward the authors’ proposals for the transformation of the foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation in relation to the post-Soviet countries. It is concluded that in its current form, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline meets the interests of Germany, while the Russian side, although it will draw economic benefits from it, will be more constrained by the tools of its policy towards the “old transit” states in particular and the entire post-Soviet space as a whole.

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