ENERGY CRISIS IN THE MOLDOVA-TRANSNISTRIA REGION: HIDDEN MOTIVES AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

The article examines the causes of the energy crisis in the Moldova-Transnistria region that broke out in early 2025, and provides evidence that it was caused not only and not so much by Kiev’s refusal to transit Russian gas through Ukraine, but also by the position taken by Euro-Atlantic structures and Chisinau. The former intended to completely oust Russian gas from Europe, as well as create the prerequisites for the expulsion of the Russian peacekeeping mission from Transnistria. The Moldovan authorities, in turn, are trying to use the critical situation in the socio-economic sphere of the PMR in order to force it to integrate into the political and economic space of Moldova, thereby finally resolving the Transnistrian issue in their favor. For this, the Moldovan authorities were ready to sacrifice the economic interests of the republic.

Due to the termination of electricity supplies to the Dniester (Moldavian) GRES, which from January 1, 2025 was unable to supply electricity to the Right Bank, Chisinau was forced to switch to importing expensive electricity from Romania. As a result, the Moldovan population received a triple blow at the beginning of 2025: increased tariffs; scanty compensation from the authorities; purchases of energy resources through external loans, which ordinary citizens will have to pay for.

A critical situation has developed in the energy sphere of Transnistria, threatening a humanitarian catastrophe. Nevertheless, despite the agreement of the Transnistrian authorities with the leadership of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation on gas supplies via the Trans-Balkan route, Chisinau stipulated this possibility with a number of difficult conditions. The artificial nature of the current situation is evidenced by the fact that on the eve of the energy crisis, there were several quite realistic scenarios for overcoming it, which are discussed in the article. Collectively, Chisinau’s actions regarding Transnistria can be qualified as imposed reintegration.

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