AFGHANISTAN’S ENERGY POLICY AFTER THE TALIBAN* RETURNED TO POWER

Taliban* national Islamist religious and political paramilitary movement finally seized political power at the end of August 2021 and returned the former name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. After that it began to modernize the socio-economic and energy spheres. However, three years later the country’s new leadership continues to face unresolved economic problems due to the freezing of the financial assets of the former government of A. Ghani, the cessation of financial assistance from Western countries and the continuation of strict financial and trade sanctions against the Taliban movement. The country is faced with the consequences of earthquakes and floods as well as unresolved security problems including from the Islamic State of Khorasan. The author notes that with the coming of Taliban to power the number of terrorist attacks has significantly decreased. It creates favorable conditions for the development of economic and energy contacts with neighbors in the region as well as China and Russia. It is worth noting that the intensification of economic contacts is taking place under conditions of forced return of refugees from Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan is in dire need of direct investment and technology as well as the development of transport and energy infrastructure given the power of Taliban movement.

The author examines the energy situation in the IEA and relations with the regional countries Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan as well as China, Iran and Russia in the energy sector. The researcher notes that some energy projects (for example the implementation of energy and infrastructure projects with Uzbekistan) contribute to the development of socio-economic relations with regional states. While other projects such as the construction of water canal in the north of the Kush-Tepa by the IEA create natural risks for the agriculture of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan located downstream of the Amu Darya. So far, the leadership of Afghanistan has avoided the negotiation process on the water issue and does not allow the resolution of issues from the position of strength of other states. Emphasizing inclusiveness in solving economic and energy issues Taliban is not ready to discuss the development of the political and social process in the IEA. According to the author, the IEA leadership will continue to adhere to Sharia law including the questions of economic and energy development of the country. In the future it may partially allow women to participate in socio-economic life. Mentioned facts will contribute to improving of the Afghan people well-being.

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