The article examines the process of inversion of the energy agenda of Russia, which refers to the rapid change in relations in the energy sector, which was the key event of the global energy crisis in 2022.
Based on the analysis of Russian oil and gas export indicators, the author substantiates the fundamental nature of the inversion process for the country’s economy. Its directions and quantitative indicators, the process of relocation of the Russian raw material potential are considered. The growing role of the Chinese direction in Russia’s oil and gas exports, as an alternative to the “collapsing” European one, is substantiated.
The objective nature of the current inversion is substantiated as a result of fundamental changes in the world economy, the main driver of which is the strengthening of international fragmentation and, as its expression, the growth of international mercantilism, with a key role in this phenomenon of national and supranational structures, and the process of replacing Russian energy carriers in Europe is explained by the aggravation of international energy competition, an important factor of which was the well-prepared and competent “energy revolution” in the United States.
As a key conclusion, taking into account the link between international fragmentation - resource relocation – energy inversion, the author substantiates the expediency of maximum concentration of the growth inertia of the Russian oil and gas sector in new areas of growing segments of the world economy.

The article examines the recent decisions of the Moldovan authorities, leading to the aggravation of the already difficult relations between Chisinau and Gazprom. First of all, they are related to the audit of the activities of Moldovogaz JSC, biased by the Accounting Chamber of the Republic.
A direct consequence of the report of the Accounts Chamber approved by the Moldovan Parliament may be an acute investment dispute between the main shareholders of Moldovogaz (primarily Gazprom) in connection with an attempt by the Moldovan authorities to claim allegedly «undervalued assets» of the company and to revise Moldova’s share in the authorized capital of the enterprise.
Chisinau’s declarations reveal not only Chisinau’s desire to restore the «historical truth», but also its intention to bankrupt Moldovogaz in order to take control of its gas infrastructure. It is obvious that experienced conductors in the form of the EU and the USA are behind the actions of the Moldovan authorities, but such a demarche of Chisinau may lead to a rupture of gas relations.

This article discusses the actions of the Russian Federation and the EU (as well as its member countries) in relation to each other within the framework of the energy direction in 2022. The paper defines the background and the position of the two sides in the corresponding area at the time of January-mid-February. It is stated that the European Union pursued a more proactive policy, directly linking it with its interests in the energy field. In turn, the Russian Federation used the energy sector not so much as one of its policy tools, but to establish contacts with other European countries.
The measures and steps taken by the Russian Federation and the EU throughout the year in connection with the intensification of their confrontation and increased open antagonism are studied in detail. Among the most drastic changes that have taken place in the policies of the two countries are the curtailment of most ties and joint projects at the state and private levels, the achievement of an unprecedented level of anti-Russian sanctions, the suspension of a significant part of the energy infrastructure and the reorientation to other directions of export and import of energy resources. A separate important component of the changes was the increased volatility of prices in the global oil and gas markets. It is concluded that the events of 2022 have marked a «point of no return» in relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in the energy field.
Not least, this is due to the lack of interest on the part of some actors at this phase in returning to the “status quo”. All sustained and possible losses of a varied nature on both sides determine their desire to end the conflict solely on their own terms. It is noted that the EU continues to demonstrate greater readiness and ability to make decisions aimed at defending interests in the energy sector than the Russian Federation. The article outlines possible ways of further development of the situation in the coming years. The further escalation of conflict with an extremely low probability of its completion in the short term is characterised as the most probable.

The article analyzes the prerequisites and main parameters of the so-called «triple gas union» proposed by Russia to the Central Asian republics for joint implementation at the end of 2022. The significance of this large–scale energy project for the key and most promising consumers of natural gas of the Russian Federation and Central Asian states – China and India – is assessed. Separately, the prospect of integration into the future new continental pipeline system of the trans-Afghan TAPI gas pipeline project is being considered.
The ongoing global geoeconomic and geopolitical transformations create a wide field of opportunities for the beginning restructuring of the continental gas transportation system. At the same time, the project of the future «gas union» looks like a large-scale plan for the development of key areas of the Eurasia continent, including the resource and transit potential of Russia and Central Asia.

The author analyzes Greater Eurasia concept and the prerequisites for the implementation of this geopolitical project. During Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine the concept became a trigger in the transformation of Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership which includes the countries of the EAEU, SCO and ASEAN and their opposition to the collective West led by the United States. In such circumstances Greater Eurasia is strengthening as a new pole of power in a multipolar world based on political parity between Moscow and Beijing. We believe that in the global economic confrontation between the US and China the countries of the Eurasian partnership should pursue a more consolidated domestic policy of non-interference of Western countries in internal affairs. This also applies to the implementation of their new economic strategies, taking into account the realities of the global recession from Beijing to Istanbul and from Moscow to Jakarta. It is also worth mentioning the BRICS format that 20 non-Western countries (from Argentina to Saudi Arabia) would like to join. In our opinion, the return to a bipolar system led by the United States and China will be established in the long term. The goal of Russia is to preserve and enhance the Eurasian space which it does by conducting Special Operation on the territory of Ukraine. It should be noted that in such complicated geopolitical conditions Moscow as the manager of Greater Eurasian Partnership is striving for greater economic and political cooperation with non-Western countries. Particular attention is focused on the development of energy projects as connecting links in cooperation of the countries of Central and South Asia, Iran, Mongolia, China, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Moscow is redirecting its energy policy towards the Southeast thereby strengthening and expanding its energy presence on Eurasian continent and also in Africa and Southeast Asia. Successful implementation of energy projects in these regions will have a favorable future impact on formation of the Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership.

Due to the current geopolitical events, the need to diversify energy supplies to the European Union has become extremely acute. After the sabotage on both branches of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, Russia and Turkey have developed a strategy for creating a gas hub in order to diversify supplies to the EU. The formation of a gas hub has become a central project for the country’s leadership.
The article examines the influence of Turkey in the Eurasian region, which has increased significantly in recent years. Separately, the authors consider the activities of Turkey within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States, whose activities are aimed at the development of socio-humanitarian and economic ties. The authors note that significant gas reserves in Turkmenistan contribute to increasing interest in this country from the Turkish Republic. Potentially, part of the extracted gas can be imported through the Southern Gas Corridor to the Turkish hub for further distribution to EU countries. However, difficulties in the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline related to the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea, and long-term contracts for the production and supply of gas between Turkmenistan and China do not allow this project to be implemented.
The authors conclude that the real prospects for the formation of a pan-European hub in Turkey are rather vague. However, the authors point out that in case of a sharp increase in demand for energy resources in the European Union, it is possible to diversify suppliers with the substitution of supplies from Russia and Turkmenistan.

The decisions of the 2022 Conference of the Parties (COP27) revealed the weakness in the development of measures and mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of the global climate goals enshrined in the Paris Agreement. The development of their nature, content and method of application is still an urgent task and is accompanied by lengthy attempts to reach consensus. The current stage of the implementation of the energy agenda is characterized by the preservation of the requirements for increasing ambitions in the issue of reducing CO2 emissions for both states and businesses, however, in a paradigm that meets exclusively the interests of developed countries from a political and socio-economic point of view. Despite the adoption of new initiatives in the field of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing assistance to developing countries to overcome the negative effects of climate change, the key problem at the level of the international community remains the development of uniform norms, standards for reducing emissions, without which achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement is difficult. The problem of so-called ecological neocolonialism remains relevant, expressed in the unwillingness of developing countries to follow the climate policy of developed countries, which does not take into account the peculiarities of development and the specifics of the economies of most countries of the world. It is expected that further joint steps taken to combat climate change, with mandatory greater consideration of the goals and characteristics of socio-economic development of other actors, will contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The article examines the peculiarities of circular economy principles application in the current conditions of high economic volatility. The authors study the experience of circular economy introduction in the Western countries, as well as options that would be most viable for Russian. The article analyzes the existing legislation in the field of waste control and recycling. Special attention should also be paid to the eco-labeling of goods, which allows consumers to make an informed choice in favor of manufacturers who actively implement the basic principles of the circular economy. The authors analyzed the existing as well as prospective state certification standards (GOST) governing the rules of labeling. Another important step in the transition to a circular economy model is the introduction of eco-design at the manufacturer level. This approach allows you to create products with an extended life span and higher degree of repairability. It is also extremely important for the Russian economy to move to a circular economy in the production of hydrocarbons, where a significant part of the waste is produced, and a significant carbon footprint remains. The authors studied the measures taken by the largest representatives of this industry in order to comply with global sustainable development practices, as well as to ensure additional stability in the face of sanctions.

The process of economic development in the post-Soviet countries in 2022 was characterized by high adaptability, new formats of economic cooperation, growing risks and uncertainty. At the same time, the countries of the region managed to not only maintain the pace of economic growth, but also, in most cases, to create a new system of economic relations that takes into account sanctions restrictions of unprecedented scale. During this period new logistics corridors for international trade and e-commerce were created as well as new trends in the structural reorganization of national economic systems. Under these conditions, changes in macroeconomic indicators in the CIS countries fully reflected their potential, risks and ability to integrate into new formats of cooperation. The economic growth rates of the CIS countries differ depending on their involvement in the channels of transmission of sanctions effects.